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Introduction

Throughout her legal career Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a stalwart defender of the
rights of individuals, seeking to secure their personal autonomy and equal citizenship against
discriminatory laws and prejudicial practices. Known as the leader of the Supreme Court's
"liberal wing" 1, Justice Ginsburg's life and legal career have focused on ensuring that minorities
(especially women) are treated equally under the law.
This paper will discuss how Justice Ginsburg's early life and experiences have helped to
shape her legal career and explain how those experiences have shaped Constitutional
jurisprudence. Born from humble parentage in Brooklyn, New York, Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
greatest role model was her mother, Celia Bader. She impressed upon young Ruth independence
and a good education. Ruth Bader Ginsburg took such lessons to heart and excelled in her
schooling. While attending law school, Ginsburg began to experience discrimination due to her
sex. She had difficulty finding a job, despite a stellar academic record because many judges
refused to hire women. When she finally managed to find a job, Ginsburg impressed. She went
on to teach at Rutgers and Columbia Law Schools and co-founded the Women's Rights Project
of the American Civil Liberties Union. Through the Women's Rights Project, Ginsburg was able
to influence American law regarding sex discrimination.
In her years on the Court, Ginsburg has been a strong advocate in ending discrimination
in all its form~d ensuring equality for all people under the law. Her opinions, and to a greater
extent, her dissents reveal her unwavering opposition to unfair treatment. Ever aware of the
invidious nature of discrimination, Ginsburg's life experiences and beliefs guide the Court to
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See generally, Adam Liptak, Court Is 'One ofMost Activist, 'Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay,
N.Y. Times, August 24, 2013.
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ensure that every individual is treated equally under the law. Ginsburg favors a cautious judicial
approach; one that embraces international law, gender equality, and abortion rights.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has spent her life championing gender equality. She is the legal
architect of the women's movement, and she considers it her life's mission that men and women
be treated equally under the law. Ginsburg has advanced her mission of sex equality and changed
American society for the better.

Biography

Early Life and Education
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was born in a poor, working class Brooklyn neighborhood on
March 15, 1933 to Nathan and Celia Bader. 2 Her father was a Russian-Jewish immigrant and her
mother was born in the United States just after her family had emigrated from Austria. 3 Celia
Bader, who undoubtedly had the largest influence on Ruth Bader Ginsburg's life and career,
taught young Ruth the value of independence and a good education. 4 Instead of attending
college, Celia Bader chose to work in a garment factory to help pay for her brother's college
education, an act that would stay with Ruth Bader Ginsburg for the rest of her life. 5
Ginsburg excelled in her studies at James Madison High School in Brooklyn. 6 She spent
her summers as a camp counselor in the Adirondack Mountains, where she served as the camp
rabbi and offered sermons to the campers. 7 It was here that her public speaking skills began to
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emerge. Unfortunately, Ginsburg's mother developed cervical cancer and struggled through
Ruth's high school years, dying the day before Ruth's high school graduation. 8
Following high school, Ginsburg entered Cornell University, having received numerous
academic scholarships. 9 Unsurprisingly, she excelled at Cornell as well, becoming a member of
Phi Beta Kappa.

10

She graduated first among the women in her class and first overall in 1954. 11

That same year, she married the love of her life, Martin D. Ginsburg, a fellow Cornell student. 12
After Cornell, Ginsburg did not immediately enroll in law school. Instead, the Ginsburgs
relocated to Fort Sill, Oklahoma because Martin Ginsburg had been drafted into the military as
an artillery officer. 13 During this time, Ruth Bader Ginsburg worked at the nearby Social
Security office and had her first child, Jane. 14
After Martin Ginsburg's discharge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg entered Harvard Law School
where her husband was already enrolled. 15 It was at Harvard Law that Ginsburg first began to
experience prejudice because she was a woman. She was one of only eight women in a class of
five hundred, and the dean admonished the women students for taking the places of males, who
he believed would actually use their legal education. 16 Despite this criticism, Ginsburg excelled
academically, becoming the first female member of the Harvard Law Review. 17 Reflecting back,
Ginsburg would tell of some of the discrimination she faced at Harvard:
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When I attended the Harvard Law School, there was no space in the dormitories
for women. Women were not admitted to the Harvard F acuity Club dining tables.
One could invite one's father but not one's wife or mother to the Harvard Law
Review Banquet. 18
It was during 1956, Ginsburg's second year of law school, that her husband contracted testicular

cancer.

19

Impressively, Ginsburg cared for her young daughter, convalescent husband, attended

both her own classes and her husband's, took notes for him, and wrote papers at his dictation, all
while excelling in her own studies. 20 Martin Ginsburg recovered and accepted a job at a New
York City law firm, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg transferred to Columbia Law School to join her
husband in New York. 21 Once again Ginsburg was selected to law review, and once again she
graduated (tied for) first in her class in 1959. 22
Early Legal Career

Even with her sterling academic record, Ruth Bader Ginsburg continued to face sex
discrimination. She was refused a Supreme Court Clerkship despite a glowing recommendation
from leading Harvard Professor, Albert Sacks. 23 Eventually, Ginsburg was hired as a clerk for
District Judge Edmund L. Palmieri?4 She impressed Judge Palmieri with her hard work and
dedication-so much so that he replaced her with another woman at the end of her clerkship. 25
After her clerkship, Ruth Bader Ginsburg worked at Columbia University's International
Procedure Project. 26 During this time she travelled to Sweden and studied the Swedish Judicial

18
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System, eventually co-authoring the book Civil Procedure in Sweden. 27 Ginsburg developed an
appreciation for international law and continues to see it as a valuable reference when shaping
United States law today? 8
Ginsburg joined the faculty at Rutgers Law School in 1963, becoming the second female
on faculty, and one of only twenty female law professors in the entire country. 29 During this
time, Ginsburg became pregnant with her second child, James, and during her pregnancy she was
forced to wear overly large clothing in order to keep her job. 30 She stayed at Rutgers Law School
for nine years, eventually becoming full professor. 31
During her time at Rutgers Law, Ruth Bader Ginsburg co-founded the Women's Rights
Project (WRP) of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Now, when complaints were
made known to the ACLU, they were referred to her because "sex discrimination was a woman's
problem" and she felt she needed to "take an active part in the effort to eliminate senseless
gender lines in the law." 32 One of Ginsburg's core beliefs about discrimination was that "it was
not helpful to the advancement of women or men to be kept from pursuing careers that once
were though not to be women's or men's work." 33 She has said:
Generalizations about the way women or men are-my life experience bears
out--cannot guide me reliably in making decisions about particular individuals.
At least in the law, I have found no natural superiority or deficiency in either sex.
In class or in grading papers from 1963 to 1980, and now in reading briefs and
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Jd. at 49.
See generally, Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her
Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. Times, April11, 2009.
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listening to argument in court for over seventeen years, I have detected no reliable
indicator of distinctly male or surely female thinking-even penmanship. 34
Working for the WRP of the ACLU, Ginsburg was able to write briefs and argue cases
before the Supreme Court that changed the national opinion on sex discrimination. At the WRP,
she was carefu~ to select cases that would convince the Supreme Court that discrimination on
the basis of sex was similar to racial discrimination and prohibited under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These were mainly employment cases that "lent
themselves to the strategy of sequential presentations leading to incremental advances." 35 In
1971, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned an Idaho law that gave men preference for
appointments as administrators of decedents' estates. 36 In that case, Reed v. Reed, a teenager,
Richard Lynn Reed, had committed suicide. Both parents, who had long been separated,
requested to be administrators of the state. 37 However, Idaho appointed the father, Cecil Reed, as
administrator because "between persons equally entitled to administer a decedent's estate, males
must be preferred to females." 38 Reflecting on the selection of cases, Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted
that:
We needed to take cases that would get attention. The Sally Reed case was a
turning point case. Sally Reed, from Boise, Idaho thought that there was
something wrong about that and thought that our justice system could right that
wrong for her. I gave them examples from lives in a way that they could
understand. 39
Ginsburg's brief for the Reed case was devoted to convincing the Court that gender, like race and
alienage, encompassed a class of individuals who encountered legally sanctioned obstacles
34

Bayer, supra at 65.
Ruth Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American Civil
Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976,8 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 390 (1976).
36
Gutgold, supra at 50.
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ld at 50.
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35

7

without regard to the individual abilities of members of the group. 40 Reed was the first sex
discrimination victory for Ginsburg.
After the Reed case, Ginsburg left Rutgers and became the first, tenured female professor
at Columbia Law School. 41 She taught constitutional law, sex discrimination law, and civil
procedure while devoting half her time to the WRP. 42 From 1972-1979, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued six cases in front of the Supreme Court, winning five of them. Revealing her strategy for
arguing these cases, she noted that it was imperative "to keep in mind your mission" and that "it
is important to keep your audience in good humor." "These were men of a certain age in the
1970s. They did not understand the notion of gender discrimination. Racial discrimination was
odious, but women were not in a ghetto, they lived side by side with men. " 43
After the Reed case, Ginsburg argued the case of Frontiero v. Richardson in front of the
Supreme Court. In this case, Sharon Frontiero was a married Air Force officer working as a
physical therapist at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. 44 The Air Force provided on-base
housing to married male service members but required her to live off base at her own expense. 45
Her husband was a student at the time. 46 Frontiero believed that she should have the same
housing benefits as male members of the military. 47 In deciding that benefits given to service
members and their families cannot be given out differently because of sex, the Court stated that:
[T]he sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often

°Campbell, supra at 32.

4

41

Gutgold, supra at 50.
!d. at 50.
43
ld at 50 citing interview with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (August 19, 201 0).
44
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
45 !d.
46 !d.
47 !d.
42

8

have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. 48
Following Frontiero was the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. Here, Stephen
Wiesenfeld's wife had died in childbirth, and he wanted to care for their infant son but was
denied Social Security benefits. 49 The Social Security Act provided survivor benefits to women
with children, but not to men with children, even though both paid Social Security taxes at the
same rate. 50 Ginsburg argued that this legislation, like many others, appeared to protect women,
even though it had the practical effect of denying women workers and their families the
protection provided to male workers. 5 1 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Ginsburg,
holding this regulation to be unconstitutional, but the Court did not hold that gender-based
distinctions were subject to strict scrutiny. 52
In 1976, Ginsburg filed an influential amicus brief in the case of Craig v. Boren. Here, an
Oklahoma law allowed women to buy 3.2% alcohol beer at the age of eighteen while men could
only purchase 3.2% beer at the age of twenty-one. 53 In this case, the statistics clearly showed that
allowing 18-21 year old men to drink posed a far greater public safety risk than allowing 18-21
year old women to drink. 54 Nonetheless, the Court found that even correct stereotypes are still
invalid. 55 It instituted a heightened level of scrutiny holding that gender-based classifications
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!d. at 686-87.
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must serve important governmental objectives, and the law must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives. 56
In the case of Califano v. Goldfarb, a retired federal worker applied for social security
survivor benefits after the death of his wife. 57 His application was denied on the ground that he
was not receiving at least one-half support from his wife when he died. 58 Mr. Goldfarb was
represented by Ginsburg for the ACLU. She once again argued that such "protective" legislation
could have an adverse effect on women workers and their families. The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that such legislation was in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. 59
Ruth Bader Ginsburg continually argued that laws that draw a distinction based on sex
should be subject to strict scrutiny. 60 The problem, Ginsburg explained, was that while "race
discrimination was immediately perceived as evil, odious, and intolerable," laws discriminating
against women were often seen as protecting women. 61 Therefore, Ginsburg chose cases that
would show how using sex as a basis for different treatment was harmful to both women and
men. She did this by carefully selecting cases that would show the inequities to both sexes.
Through her diligent efforts and meticulous arguments, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was able to change
the standing of women in the eyes of the law.
Early Judicial Career
In 1980, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. Before her appointment, there were only eight women on any of the federal courts.

56
57
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Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976).
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During her tenure on the Court of Appeals, Ginsburg made fifty-seven hires for law clerk, intern,
and secretary positions, but it was noted that none of those hired had been African-Americans, a
fact for which Ginsburg was sharply criticized because she had been a strong supporter of
disparate-impact statistics. 63
After thirteen years on the Court of Appeals, President Clinton nominated Ruth Bader
Ginsburg to the Supreme Court to fill the seat of Justice Byron White at the recommendation of
then Attorney General Janet Reno. 64 Her confirmation hearings went quickly and smoothly. On
the first day of her hearings, though, Ginsburg noted that she would not reveal how she would
vote on particular issues. She said: "I come to this proceeding to be judged as a judge ... .It would
be wron~y or preview . . .how I would cast my vote on questions the Supreme Court
may be called on to decide." 65 This lack of disclosure was called the "The Ginsburg Rule" by the
press. 66 However, Ginsburg gave thoughtful responses on many questions posed by the Senators.
She informed the Senators that she favored abortion rights and the Equal Rights Amendment and
denounced discrimination against homosexuals. 67 She also answered a range of questions dealing
with her judging philosophy, the role of federal courts, and substantive areas of the law. When
Senator Edward Kennedy noted that her experience and work with sex discrimination could also
sensitize her to racial discrimination, she responded:
Senator Kennedy, I am alert to discrimination. I grew up during World War II in a
Jewish family. I have memories as a child, even before the war, of being in a car
with my parents and passing a place in [Pennsylvania], a resort with a sign out in
front that read: 'No dogs or Jews allowed.' Signs of that kind existed in this
63

Ed Whelan, What Happened to the Consensus-Builder?, National Review Online (May 12,
2010).
64
Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court, 82 (2007).
65
Associated Press. "Ruth Bader Ginsburg is Confirmed Senate Votes 96-3 for Second Supreme
Court Justice."
66
Gutgold, supra at 55.
67 d
~ . at 55.
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country during my childhood. One couldn't help but be sensitive to discrimination
living as a Jew in America at the time of World War 11. 68
When asked about her support of abortion, Ginsburg noted that it is "something central to a
woman's life, her dignity and it is a decision she has to make for herself and when the
government makes that decision for her, she is being treated as less than a fully adult human
responsible for her own choices. " 69 In the end, Senators from both parties praised Ruth Bader
Ginsburg for her forthrightness, and she was confirmed quickly by a vote of96-3.

Recent Activities
In January 2012, Justice Ginsburg travelled to Egypt for four days of discussions with
judges, law school faculty, law school students, and legal experts. 70 Part of the purpose of
Ginsburg's visit was to "listen and learn" as Egypt began its transition to democracy. 71 She
answered questions about the American justice system and the Constitution and told students at
Cairo University that she was inspired by the Egyptian revolution. 72
In an interview that caused some consternation back in the United States, Ginsburg noted
that the first requirement of a new constitution should be that it "safeguard basic fundamental
human rights, like our First Amendment." 73 Asked if Egypt should model its constitution on
those of other nations, Ginsburg said that Egypt "should be aided by all Constitution writing that
has gone on since the end of World War II," noting, "I would not look to the U.S. Constitution, if

68

!d. at 55 citing transcript of Ginsburg confirmation hearings.
!d. at 55 citing transcript from MacNeil-Lehr NewsHour (July 21, 1993).
70
US. Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg Expresses Admiration for Egyptian Revolution and
Democratic Transition. (Press Release). U.S. Embassy Cairo. (February 1, 2012).
71
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69

Cairo, (January 28, 2012).
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73
Ariane de Vogue. Ginsburg Likes S. Africa as Mode/for Egypt. ABC News. (February 3,
2012).
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I were drafting a constitution in the year 2012. I might look to the Constitution of South Africa.
That was a deliberate attempt to have a fundamental instrument of government that embraced
basic human rights, had an independent judiciary.... It really is, I think, a great piece of work
that was done. Much more recent than the U.S. Constitution." 74 Ginsburg did emphasize that that
United States was fortunate to have a constitution authored by "very wise" men but pointed out
that in the 1780s, no women were able to participate in the process and slavery still existed in the

u.s.7s
In an August, 2013 interview, Ginsburg blasted the Supreme Court as being overly
activist. She lamented joining the Northwest Austin Municipal Uti/. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder opinion
which laid the groundwork for the Shelby County v. Holder decision that effectively struck down
the heart of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 76 She believed that the Court was wrong to conclude
that protecting minority voters was not needed, noting a line from her dissent that stated: "It is
like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet." 77 Ginsburg
also noted that in general, "if it's measured in terms of readiness to overturn legislation, this is
one of the most activist courts in history." 78
Ginsburg received some criticism for her comments, and in an October 2013, New York

Times article, the journalist noted that "[i]f judicial activism is defined as the tendency to strike
down laws, the court led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. is less activist than any court in the
last 60 years." 79 It is likely, however, that Ginsburg was referring to the Court's decisions to

!d.
75 !d.
76
Adam Liptak, Court Is 'One ofMost Activist, 'Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. Times,
August 24, 2013.
77
!d. citing Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
78 !d.
79
Adam Liptak, How Activist is the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (October 12, 2013).
74
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overturn some major pieces of legislation such as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the
Voting Rights Act, and the Defense of Marriage Act. Although Ginsburg herself was in the
majority on the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, she said that there was a
method behind her votes to strike down some laws and not others. 80 She believes that some laws
require special scrutiny, especially when "fundamental rights are at stake, when the political
process has been frustrated, or when disfavored minorities are singled out for mistreatment." 81
Also of note, Justice Ginsburg became the first Supreme Court justice to officiate a samesex marriage when she married Kennedy Center President, Michael Kaiser and government
economist, John Roberts on August 31,2013. 82

Future Plans and Retirement
While on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has had to deal with serious health problems, but
still remains active. In 1999, Ginsburg was diagnosed with colon cancer, but underwent
chemotherapy and radiation therapy and did not miss a day on the bench. 83 Again in 2009,
Justice Ginsburg underwent cancer surgery, this time for pancreatic cancer. 84 But once again
showing her resilience, Ginsburg was released from the hospital and heard oral arguments four
days later. 85 Despite these health concerns, she works out with a trainer twice a week and the
National Institute of Health says she is in fine health. 86 She has repeatedly stated that her

!d.
81 !d.
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Justice Ginsburg Officiates at Same-Sex Wedding, FoxNews (September 1, 2013).
83
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84
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24, 2013).
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retirement plans would focus on her health and not on who would appoint her successor, even if
it could alter the balance of the Court. 87
Important Opinions, Concurrence, and Dissents
From her first week on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has never held back, often asking the
first question at oral arguments in a way that frames the discussion. 88 Even though Ginsburg has
/'/

a tendency to ask many questions during oral argument, she rarely departs from the more

/~

customary written dissent process. 89 When Ginsburg strongly disagrees with the majority,
however, she does not hesitate to read her dissents from the bench as was the case in 2007 and
once again in 2012. 9091 In 2007, Justice Ginsburg read two dissents, discussed below, from the
bench in which she criticized the majority for opinions that she felt jeopardized women's
rights. 92 The first case, Gonzales v. Carhart, dealt with the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The
second, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., concerned pay discrimination. Ginsburg's
opinions, concurrences, and dissents often concern some type of invidious discrimination, and
her writing is potent and impactful.

Majority Opinions
In a case that has been described as a "fitting capstone to her career as an advocate for
gender equality," United States v. Virginia provided Ginsburg with an opportunity to make plain
her views on sex discrimination. 93 She unequivocally stated that: "[n]either federal nor state

87Id.
Liptak, supra.
89
Gutgold, supra at 57.
90
ld. at 57.
91 L.1ptak , supra.
92
Gutgold, supra at 57.
93
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Opinions,
http://www 1.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/
reports/winter2004/opinions. (Accessed November 20, 2013).
88
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government acts compatibly with equal protection when a law or official policy denies to
women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and
capacities. " 94
At the start of the case, Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was the only single-sex school
among Virginia's public colleges. 95 As a result, the United States sued Virginia and VMI,
alleging that the exclusively male admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 96 In response to the Fourth Circuit's order to remedy the Constitutional
violation, Virginia proposed a parallel women's program: Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership (VWIL), located at Mary Baldwin College, which was a private liberal arts school for
women. 97 Both the District Court and Fourth Circuit affirmed after deferentially reviewing
Virginia's plan, noting that providing single-sex educational programs was a legitimate
objective. 98 The court did recognize that its analysis might bypass equal protection scrutiny, so,
in response, it asked whether VMI and VWIL students would receive "substantively
comparable" benefits. 99
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that parties seeking to defend sex-based
government action must demonstrate an exceeding persuasive justification for that action. 100 In
order to meet that burden, "a state must show at least that the [challenged] classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially

94

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
ld. at 515.
96
Jd. at 515.
97 ~d. at 515.
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ld. at 515.
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!d. at 515.
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Jd. at 515.
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related to the achievement of those objectives." 101 Ginsburg wrote that Virginia had not shown
an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding women from the training afforded by
VMI.102 Although Virginia argued that VMI's male-only admission policy was in furtherance of
a state policy of diversity, Ginsburg noted that record showed just the opposite. 103 In response to
Virginia's creation of a parallel program, VWIL, Ginsburg noted that it was extremely lacking.
There were methodological differences that Virginia claimed were "justified pedagogically,"
based on important differences between men and women. 104 Justice Ginsburg refuted this,
however, writing that generalization about women and estimates of what is appropriate for most
women, no longer justify "denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
outside the average description." 105 The VWIL course would not provide women with the same
type of rigorous training, facilities, courses, faculty, financial opportunities, reputation and
prestige that VMI affords to males. 106 Summing up, Ginsburg wrote that Virginia had "created a
VWIL program fairly appraised as a "pale shadow" ofVMI in terms of the range of curricular
choices and faculty stature, funding, prestige, alumni support and influence." 107 Ginsburg's
majority opinion in this case allowed her to reinforce existing law that sex-based classifications
are virtually indefensible.
Another majority opinion written by Justice Ginsburg was ML.B. v. S.L.J. In this case,
Mississippi Chancery Court permanently terminated a mother's, M.L.B.'s, parental rights.

108
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!d. at 516 citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (internal quotation
omitted).
102
!d. at 534.
103
!d. at 539-40.
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M.L.B. appealed, but Mississippi required that she pay $2,352.36 for record preparation fees in
advance.

109

M.L.B. could not pay the fees, and, as a result, her appeal was dismissed. 110 In her

opinion, Ginsburg wrote "[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children
are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance in our society." 111
She emphasized that M.L.B. 's case, dealing with a state's authority to permanently sever the
parent-child bond, demands close consideration due to the magnitude of such a decision. 112
Relying on prior case law, Ginsburg found that the "Court was unanimously of the view that the
interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come
within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 113 Against
this backdrop, the majority determined that even though the case was civil in nature, this should
not deter the Court from denying M.L.B. a right to appeal (due to her indigence) because of the
fundamental rights involved and the severity of the penalty. 114 Justice Ginsburg recognized that a
mother's right to parenthood should not be determined by the size of her wallet, and reaffirmed
her standing as a beacon of hope

agains~ ~justice

to women.

~
In the case of Olmstead v. L.C. ; Ginsburg once again showed that she was a champion of
those who have been discriminated against and was sensitive to those who may need extra
protection under the law. Here, L.C. and E.W. were mentally handicapped women with a history
of treatment in institutional settings. 115 L.C. was voluntarily admitted to the Georgia Regional

109

!d. at 106.
ld. at 106.
111
Id. at 116, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (internal quotations
omitted).
112
ld. at 116-17.
113
!d. at 119 citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
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Hospital at Atlanta (GRH) and confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit. 116 Shortly after, her

~~

condition stabilized, and her treatment team agreed that she could be moved in one of the
community-based programs the state supported. 117 Despite this, L.C. remained institutionalized
for several more years until the state placed her in a community-based treatment program. 118
E.W. was voluntarily admitted to GRH and confined to treatment in a psychiatric unit. 119
It was concluded that she could be treated appropriately in a community-based facility, but she

remained institutionalized for more than a year after this assessment, until the District Court
issued its judgment in the case. 120
L.C. filed suit while still in a segregated environment, alleging that the state's failure to
place her in a community-based program, after it had been determined to be appropriate, violated
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which required that services be
administered to mentally handicapped individuals in the most integrated setting appropriate to
the needs of the handicapped individuals. 121 E.W. intervened and stated an identical claim. The
state claimed that the segregation was financially based and that requiring immediately transfer
in cases such as this would "fundamentally alter" the state's activity. 122 The District Court agreed
with the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeals did as well. However, it remanded for reassessment,
the state's cost-based argument. 123
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that "[u]njustified isolation ... is properly
regarded as discrimination based on disability." 124 In requiring the state to make reasonable
accommodation in order to avoid discrimination, the Court did find that the fundamentalalteration allowed for more leeway than the Court of Appeals believed. 125 Ever sensitive to
discrimination in all its forms, Ginsburg noted that identification of unjustified segregation as
discrimination reflects two judgments: "[i]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and
benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated
are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life." 126 Institutionalization also
severely diminishes individuals' everyday life activities and quality of life by severing
connections to family and loved ones. 127 Ginsburg, by seeking to protect those with mental
disabilities, demonstrated here that she in acutely aware of the invidiousness of discrimination in
all of its forms.
When it comes to criminal cases, Justice Ginsburg often finds herself favoring
defendants' rights. Such was the case in Ring v. Arizona, a case which concerned the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions. In that case, Timothy Ring and several
others stole an armored van, murdered the security guard, and made off with more than $833,000
in cash and checks. 128 At trial, the jury found Ring guilty of felony murder. 129 However, under
Arizona law, Ring could not be sentenced to death unless further findings were made. 130 Arizona
law directed the judge who presided at the trial to conduct a sentencing hearing to determine the
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existence or nonexistence of certain circumstances in order to determine the sentence. 131 The
judge found those circumstances to be present since it had come to light that Ring was the one
who had shot the security guard, and also that Ring was a major participant in the robbery. 132
Because of this, Ring was sentenced to death. 133
Ginsburg, once again writing for the majority, found Arizona's sentencing law to violate
the Sixth Amendment. She held that: "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 134 Because the judge, and not the jury,
found that Ring had shot the security guard and was a major participant in the robbery, Ring
could not be sentenced to death. In holding so, Ginsburg wrote that: "the right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the
factfmding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death." 135 Ginsburg's Sixth Amendment interpretation now allows
defendants to have their sentence determined by a more sympathetic jury when the sentencing
determination requires a finding of aggravating factors.

Concurring Opinions
In the case of Brogan v. United States, Ginsburg wrote a concurrence in which she warns
that the majority's decision has conferred a great power upon the prosecutor to manufacture
crimes. In this case, Brogan received cash payments from a real estate company whose
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employees were represented by the union. 136 Federal agents then visited Brogan at his home,
identified themselves, and asked Brogan if he would answer some questions. 137 He agreed, and
the agents asked him whether he had received any cash or gifts from the union. 138 Brogan told
/

them that he had ;~ and the agents then disclosed that a search of union headquarters had shown
the contrary. 139 Brogan was arrested and charged with accepting unlawful cash payments and
making a false statement. 140
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 did not allow for the
"exculpatory no" doctrine since the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. 141 The
"exculpatory no" doctrine had previously been looked upon favorably by some Courts of
Appeals. In it, a defendant simply denies his own guilt. 142 Scalia noted that the statute covers
"any false statement," and because of this unequivocal language, the doctrine would not apply. 143
Justice Ginsburg, although concurring in the judgment, wrote to warn against prosecutors
now having the ability to manufacture crimes due to this ruling. She provided several answers in
which she illustrated the ways in which informal encounters between agents and their target can
easily lead to a felony conviction.

144

Justice Ginsburg noted the immense leverage that a

prosecutor has with such a weapon in her pocket, and explained that it was doubtful that
Congress intended to create such a situation. 145 Keenly aware of the ways in which defendants
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may be prejudiced, Justice Ginsburg can be counted upon to bring such situations to light and
ensure that all receive a fair chance at justice.
In the landmark Gruffer v. Bollinger case, Ginsburg joined in the opinion but wrote a
separate concurrence in order to express her concerns that the affirmative measures would be
unnecessary in twenty-five years. In this case, law school applicants who were denied admission
to Michigan Law School challenged the race-conscious admissions policy. 146 Michigan Law
School sought a "mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect
and learn from each other." 147 Michigan's admission policy focused on GPA, LSAT score, a
personal statement, letters of recommendation, and an essay describing the 'Yays in which the
applicant will contribute to the diversity of the law schoo1. 148 In the majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor made sure to note that the admissions policy looked beyond grades and test scores to
other criteria such as "the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, and the areas and difficulty of undergraduate
course selection" in order to achieve "that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." 149 However, the
admissions policy did make special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which
have been historically discriminated against, like "African Americans, Hispanics, and Native
Americans" in order to reach a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students. 150
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Grutter was a white Michigan resident who had applied to the Law School with a 3.8
GPA and a 161 LSAT score. 151 Initially placed on a waiting list, she was later rejected. 152 She
filed suit alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 153 Justice O'Connor noted that racial classification must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.

154

This means that when race-based classification is needed to further a compelling

governmental interest, this does not violate the Equal Protection Clause as long as the narrowtailoring prong is also satisfied. The majority then looked to determine whether the Law School's
use of race is justified by a compelling state interest. 155 The majority found that the Law School
did have a compelling interest in obtaining a diverse student body due to the substantial benefits
of breaking down racial stereotypes and helping to better understand persons of different. J }-~~
156
races. Furthermore, the majority found that the admissions program was
it

narrow~ause

did not use a quota system, but instead used a flexible, holistic approach that considered all
elements of diversity. 157 As a result, the Court found that the Law School's admissions policy did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 158
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to address some of her
concerns. She argued that "many minority students encounter inadequate and unequal
educational opportunities," and, as a result, such affirmative programs are necessary to ensure
equal opportunity. 159 In doing so, Ginsburg expressed doubt as to the majority's view that such
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remedial measures would not be necessary in 25 years. In noting this, Ginsburg showed her

A

wisdom and understand ~hat such cultural changes do not happen overnight, having experience

6

such discrimination herself. Perhaps because Ginsburg felt the sting of discrimination in her own
education, she was especially sensitive to the same happening to others, and, consequently, she
felt compelled to write such a pragmatic concurrence.
Dissenting Opinions

Ginsburg rarely departs from the customary written dissent process, but when she does, it
typically involves a major disagreement on the bench regarding women's or minority rights. As
an outspoken advocate for women's rights throughout her entire life, Ginsburg saves her most
critical dissents for cases in which she believes that these rights are jeopardized.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Ginsburg wrong a strong dissent that she
read from the bench in 2007. In this case, Lilly Ledbetter worked for Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company (Goodyear) at its Alabama plant from 1979 through 1998. 160 Throughout this time,
employees were evaluated based on performance and given or denied raise~ased on these
ratings. 161 In 1998, Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC, alleging sex discrimination
and filed formal charges. 162 During the trial, Ledbetter introduced evidence that her supervisors
had given her poor evaluations because of her sex, that her pay was not increased as much as it
would have been if she had been rated fairly, and that the past decisions continued to affect her
pay throughout employment. 163 The jury found in Ledbetter's favor and awarded her back pay
and damages. 164 On appeal, Goodyear argued that Ledbetter's pay discrimination claim was time

160

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).
ld. at 621.
162
ld. at 621.
163
Jd. at 622.
164
Jd. at 622.
161

25

barred because the claimed discrimination did not occur within the 180 days prior to the filing of
the EEOC questionnaire, as required by law. 165 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
agreed and reversed the District Court's decision. 166
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that "any unlawful employment practice,
including those involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the period
prescribed by the statute." 167 The Majority relied on prior case law to inform its decision, wrote
that the charging period is triggered only when a discrete unlawful practice takes place and that a
new violation does not occur (thus triggering a new charging period) upon the occurrence of
subsequent nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects relating to the past
discrimination. 168 Because the paychecks that Ledbetter did receive within the charging period
were found to be nondiscriminatory even though they may have related to past discrimination,
the majority found that Ledbetter's claims were time barred. 169
Ginsburg, clearly in disagreement with the majority, wrote a stinging dissent. She wrote
that the "Court's insistence on immediate contest [of discrimination] overlooks common
characteristics of pay discrimination." 170 She noted that pay disparities are significantly different
than other adverse actions since they occur in small increments, and are thus harder to detect
than termination, failure to promote, or refusal to hire. 171 Furthermore, Goodyear kept salaries
confidential, making it much harder for Ledbetter to discover the discrimination. 172 Ginsburg
advocated for "counting both the pay-setting decisions and that actual payment of a
165
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discriminatory wage as unlawful practices." 173 She felt that this application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act was much more faithful to the broad remedial purpose of the statute as opposed
to the majority's "cramped" interpretation. 174
Following the case, Ginsburg said "[s]everal members of Congress responded within
days after the [C]ourt's decision was issued," 175 and President Obama signed the Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act into law. 176 Following Ginsburg's application of Title VII, the new law allows for acts
outside of the 180 day charging period to be incorporated in to a pay discrimination claim if it
relates to a present act of discrimination. Justice Ginsburg has a framed copy of the Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act hanging in her chambers, and she counts it as one of her proudest achievements. 177
In Ricci v. DeStefano, a disparate-impact discrimination case, Ginsburg's dissent argued
that flaws in the majority's analysis led to an unjust outcome. In this case, twenty or so white
New Haven firefighters and one Latino firefighter alleged Title VII and Equal Protection Clause
violations. 178 In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took examinations to qualify for
promotions. 179 When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed the
minority candidates, the major and city politicians ignored the test results and denied promotions
to the candidates who scored well. 180 As a result, the firefights brought suit.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that New Haven's race-based action
like New-1-fuveu'"s is impermissible under Title VII unless it could "demonstrate a strong basis in
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evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute." 181 The majority rejected the argument that New Haven did not discriminate, writing that
the city engaged in "express, race-based decisionmaking" 182 because it declined to certify the test
scores because of the disparity between whites and minorities. Next, Kennedy sought to
determine whether there were any lawful justifications for the discrimination. 183 The majority
concluded that "certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination-actions that
are themselves based on race-are constitutional only where there is a 'strong basis in evidence'
that the remedial actions were necessary." 184 Because of this, the majority found that once New
Haven had established its selection criteria, it could not then invalidate the test results unless
there was a strong basis in evidence showing an impermissible disparate impact.

185

Using this

standard, Kennedy concluded that "[t]here [was] no evidence -let alone the required strong
basis in evidence- that the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or because
other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the City."

186

He noted that

"fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer's reliance on race to the detriment of
individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions." 187
Ginsburg dissented. She noted that the "strong basis in evidence standard" was inapt.

188

She also found that there was substantial evidence that New Raven's tests were flawed, and that
there were better assessment methods, and noted that most municipalities did not evaluate their
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fire-officer candidates as New Haven did. 189 Justice Ginsburg, was acutely aware of how
pervasive racial discrimination was in municipal employment 190, and ever with an eye towards
ending such discrimination, sought to show how certain practices could be "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." 191

Gonzales v. Carhart, another case in which Ginsburg read her dissent from the bench,
dealt with the validity of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of2003, a federal statute regulating
abortion procedures. 192 In this case, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that the
government "has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetallife," 193
and that the ban fit that interest so as to not create an undue burden on the mother. 194 Kennedy
also found that a health exception was unnecessary. 195 The majority further held that "ethical and
moral concems" 196 , such as an interest in fetal life, constituted "substantial" state interests, that
could be a basis for legislation at all times during pregnancy, as long as those interests would not
impose an undue burden on the mother.
In her strong dissent, Ginsburg wrote that the majority's decision was an "alarming"

197

one that ignored precedent and "refuse[d) to take Casey and Stenberg seriously." 198 Focusing on
the Casey opinion, Ginsburg wrote:
[w]omen, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation. Their ability to
189
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realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to their
ability to control their reproductive lives. Thus, legal challenges to undue
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized
notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her
life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature. 199
Ginsburg also criticized the lack of health exception, arguing that "the absence of a health
exception burdens all women for whom it is relevant-women who, in the judgment of their
doctors, require an intact D & E because other procedures would place their health at risk. " 200
Ginsburg strongly condemned Congress for substituting their own preferences in place of the
"reasoned medical judgments of highly trained doctors. " 20 1 Noting that the Court was
"differently composed than it was when [it] last considered a restrictive abortion regulation,"
Ginsburg has said that she thinks "long term, [her] opinion will be the law." 202
In another case concerning a major piece of legislation, the Court Shelby County, Ala v.
Holder held that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) provision setting forth the coverage formula was

unconstitutional. The VRA was first enacted in 1965 to remedy pervasive racial discrimination in
voting. 203 It was subsequently modified and reaffirmed as law several times over.

204

One section

of the VRA targeted those jurisdictions that "had maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to
voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the
1964 Presidential election. " 205 A "covered" jurisdiction was able to "bail out" of the VRA
provisions "if it had not used a test or device in the preceding five years "for the purpose or with
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the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 206 In those
covered jurisdictions, no change in voting procedure could be made unless approved by federal
authorities. 207 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, struck down the coverage formula.
He reasoned that the coverage formula conflicted with the principles of federalism and equal
sovereignty of the states?08 The majority argued that this was because "[t]he conditions that
originally justified [the coverage formula] no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions. " 209
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that it is not the Court's place to "substitute
its judgment for that of Congress, but to determine whether the legislative record sufficed to
show that Congress could rationally have determined that its chosen provisions were appropriate
methods."210 Ginsburg concluded that there was ample evidence for Congress to determine that
the VRA was still necessary, including the DOJ blocking over 700 voting changes because they
were discriminatory. 211 Furthermore, with regard to Alabama, it "was found to have "deni[ed] or
abridge[ d] voting rights on account of race or color more frequently than nearly all other States
in the Union."212 In an apt metaphor, Ginsburg wrote that "[t]hrowing out preclearance when it
has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet."213 Justice Ginsburg continues to
recognize that discrimination persists today, and, although it may not be as overt, it is just as
damaging to the principles of justice and equality.
206

Jd.
Jd.
208
Jd.
209
Jd.
210
ld.
211
Jd.
212
Id.
213
ld.
207

at 2620.
at 2620.
at 2631.
at 2631.
at 2638.
at2639.
at 2645.
at 2649.
31

Conclusion
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has spent her entire legal career championing legal equality.
Whether it is women in the workplace or minorities at the voting booth, Justice Ginsburg has
always been keenly aware of the ways in which discrimination can affect the nation. In an essay,
Harvard professor, Michael J. Klarman wrote that Ginsburg "was an organizer, mobilizer,
publicist, and educator for the sex equality movement-just as Thurgood Marshall had been for
the civil right movement a generation earlier."214 She was the legal architect of the women's
movement, and her work as the leader of the Women's Rights Project of the ACLU changed
Amerl an law regarding gender equality. On the Supreme Court, she continues to work toward
ensuring every individual is treated equally under the law. Through her intellect, courage, and
I

humanity, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has advanced equality for all in the United States and changed
American society for the better.
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